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Abstract 
Since their introduction, smartphones remain one of the most used handheld devices and this trend is predicted to 
continue in the coming years. Consequently, the number of attacks on smartphones is increasing exponentially; 
current market research shows that data traffic generated by smartphones will escalate by tenfold in 2019. Such 
an increase in traffic indicates that the smartphone industry will remain an attractive target for attackers. Whilst 
smartphone users are aware of the benefits of installing antivirus applications for malware evasion, they have 
limited knowledge on how to mitigate MiTM attacks. Furthermore, application developers do not always consider 
implementing appropriate security checks as an important step during the development stage. 
In this paper, we describe MiTM attacks based on SSL and DNS and provide a discussion on how they can be 
mitigated using SSL Pinning and DNSSec. We complete our discussion on mitigation of MiTM attacks by 
including challenges, limitations and recommendations for application developers and smartphone users.   In 
particular, we suggest that application developers pass a certification test regarding their use of SSL Pinning 
and/or DNSSec.   
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INTRODUCTION 
For the first time since the release of smartphones, global sales are predicted to reach 1 billion units in 2014 
(IDC, 2014) and as a result, smartphone data traffic will increase by tenfold in 2019 (Richter, 2013). These 
forecasts depict the on-going competition amongst the top 4 leading smartphone operating systems (OS) - 
Android, iOS, Windows Phone, Blackberry- and their corresponding device manufacturers. Nowadays, 
smartphones with high computational power are sold at affordable prices and hence are easily accessible to 
interested buyers. Furthermore, smartphone sales have a direct impact on the smartphone application ecosystem; 
the application markets are driven by the demand and supply of application downloads and uploads, 
respectively.  
Smartphone applications can be considered to be the equivalent of software programs on the desktop platform. 
They perform a set of tasks depending on the user’s needs and require some initial input, such as personal 
information, to function properly. As such, there is a growing concern around the transmission of user’s personal 
information to and from the device.  
In the first half of 2014, several major security flaws were discovered on the smartphone platform. These include 
Apple’s SSL vulnerability (Schwartz, 2014) and the HeartBleed bug in the OpenSSL library (Codenomicon, 
2014). In both cases, the implementation of the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol was compromised and 
private communication and personal information were divulged through Man-in-The-Middle (MiTM) attacks.     
The aforementioned events constitute the primary motivation for this paper. We ask the question: How to re-
enforce the SSL protocol to prevent intruders from snooping on traffic to and from smartphones. To answer the 
question, we investigate the use of two well-known methods which provide authentication between sender and 
receiver: first, SSL Pinning and second, Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSec), which can be 
regarded as a secured Domain Name System (DNS). The underlying rationale for both of these methods is that 
by correctly identifying the source and destination of traffic, a third-party will be unable to intercept and capture 
communications for malicious purposes. 
In the rest of the paper, we describe how SSL and DNS work and how MiTM attacks against them can be 
implemented. We then elaborate on how SSL certificate Pinning and DNS Security Extensions can be used as a 
preventative measure for these attacks, while also noting their limitations. Finally, we make recommendations 
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which focus on the role of the application developer in ensuring that security mechanisms are implemented in 
order to prevent the attacks we have discussed. 
MiTM ATTACKS 
We provide a brief description of MiTM attacks and elaborate on three types of attacks, based on SSL and DNS, 
which are commonly exploited on the smartphone platform.   
MiTM can be regarded as an active eavesdropping attack. In order to achieve this, the attacker will insert himself 
between the client/server communication flows. If successful, the attacker will be able to relay traffic to and 
from the client and server without either endpoint noticing the presence of a third-party. MiTM attacks have 
been successfully deployed on the desktop platform. However, as the smartphone is rapidly gaining market 
share, attackers are now shifting their focus to smartphone users as their MiTM victims. For this reason, we 
describe three popular attacks (SSL Hijacking, SSL Stripping, DNS Spoofing) targeted at smartphone 
applications.      
SSL Hijacking 
Traditionally, the SSL protocol is implemented to secure information transmitted between a browser and a web 
server on the desktop platform. As an initial step, there is an exchange of SSL certificates issued by a Certificate 
Authority (CA). Browsers come with a pre-installed list of trusted CAs and will communicate with a web server 
that has been issued a certificate from one of the CAs.  
However, on the smartphone platform, applications can be either web- or client-based. A Web-based application 
uses Web 2.0 technologies and can be displayed on the in-built web browser. Client-based applications use the 
WebView class (Ogden, 2012) to embed web contents in the application. As smartphones are sold with a set of 
pre-installed root certificates, it is easier to trick users to accept spoofed SSL certificates on client-based 
applications.   
As an example, consider the following scenario: To intercept traffic to and from Alice’s smartphone, Eve 
decides to carry out an MiTM attack. With the help of social engineering, Eve is able to find out Alice’s 
favourite games and tricks her to install a free application. However, to use this application, Alice is required to 
install a (rogue) SSL certificate generated by Eve; once the certificate is on Alice’s smartphone, Eve can capture 
all the traffic from by the device – as shown in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: MiTM attack by SSL Hijacking  
 
The fake SSL certificate allows Eve to intercept traffic generated by both web- and client-based applications. If 
an application on Alice’s smartphone needs to connect to an external server over the web, a DNS query will be 
performed to establish the connection. From this point onwards, Eve’s computer will act as the (MiTM) proxy 
and capture packets and relay them to and from Alice’s smartphone and external servers.  
SSL Stripping 
The concept of SSL Stripping was first introduced in 2009 (Marlinspike, 2009). The main idea behind this attack 
is to give the victims a false sense of security by believing that they are communicating over an HTTPS 
connection, when in fact the MiTM attack will relay traffic over an HTTP connection.  
 
It has been observed by Marlinspike in (Marlinspike, 2009) that smartphone users rarely type the URL in its 
entirety, instead only inputting the domain name part of a website. Normally, the application then proceeds by 
redirecting the traffic over an HTTPS connection. SSL Strip intercepts the HTTPS redirect and maps the links to 
its HTTP equivalent. While the attacker will still communicate to the server over an HTTPS connection, the 
client on the other hand will receive traffic over an HTTP connection and will be unaware of it, as depicted in 
Figure 2.  
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Figure 2: MiTM attack by SSL Stripping 
  
DNS Spoofing  
This type of MiTM attack targets the DNS protocol. DNS translates logical web addresses into their 
corresponding IP addresses. Every DNS query that is sent over the network contains a uniquely generated 
identification (ID) number, whose purpose is to identify queries and responses. To carry out DNS Spoofing, the 
attacker can intercept a DNS query sent out by the client and extract the unique ID to create a fake DNS 
response which will be accepted by the client. Currently, such attacks cannot be easily detected on the 
smartphone, hence, making the attacker’s job easier to re-route traffic to a malicious server.  
 
In the remainder of the paper, we provide further discussion on SSL and DNS and explain how to mitigate the 
attacks mentioned here by applying SSL Pinning and/or DNSSec.  
RELATED WORK  
The authors of (Fahl, et al., 2012) studied incorrect implementations of SSL in Android applications. Their 
proposed tool revealed that 8% of the 13,500 applications considered included SSL code that rendered the 
applications prone to MiTM attacks. For those applications where the MiTM attacks were successful, Fahl et al. 
collected credentials for applications belonging to categories including social networking, finance and business. 
Additionally, the authors were able to tamper with the virus signature database of an antivirus application in 
order to inject fake signatures or even completely disable the application. In (Fahl, Harbach, Perl, Koetter, & 
Smith, 2013), the authors conducted a survey, involving application developers, to determine the likely causes of 
incorrect SSL implementation on the smartphone platform. Based on the findings, a new, simplified scheme for 
handling SSL was proposed.   
The work of (Tendulkar & Enck, 2014) and of (Clark & van Oorschot, 2013) investigated the challenges faced 
by application developers when implementing SSL and performing SSL verification in smartphone applications. 
Both papers highlighted the usage of SSL Pinning as a means to mitigate MiTM attacks. However, the authors 
also pointed out that due to lack of documentation, application developers often misuse SSL P inning and as a 
result, the applications are rendered more vulnerable to MiTM attacks.  
We turn next to discussions of SSL Pinning and DNSSec. 
SSL PINNING  
On the desktop platform, web browsers are the default option for accessing contents over the Internet. However, 
in smartphone applications, there exists a limited number of web browsers, which in turn makes it easier to 
embed all the necessary controls to validate SSL certificates properly. On the other hand, the smartphone 
platform is application-centric and applications can be written by anyone who owns a developer’s account. 
Whilst each platform has strict application development guidelines, developers do not always abide by the rules 
and the application source code is, in general, not verified for correct SSL implementation before being uploaded 
to the marketplace. Similarly, there are several other factors, as described in (Fahl, Harbach, Perl, Koetter, & 
Smith, 2013), that can lead to improper use of SSL while building an application.       
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However, most of these problems can be eliminated by the use of SSL Pinning which ensures that the 
application checks the server’s certificate against a known copy bundled in the application before it is deployed 
on the market. An application developer knows in advance which servers the application is required to connect 
to and, in turn, can specify in the source code the certificates that should be trusted.   
Generally, as in web browsers, smartphone platforms are despatched with a set of trusted root CA certificates. 
For instance, Android 4.2 and iOS 6 each trust more than 100 root CA certificates. Instead of blindly trusting all 
the embedded root CA certificates, SSL Pinning allows the developer to create their own Keystore which 
includes their trusted certificates; when requesting acceptance of a certificate, the application will use the 
customised KeyStore to check for the server certificate and hostname before proceeding with transfer of 
information.   
While it is an attractive and simple way of mitigating MiTM attacks, SSL Pinning is not completely immune to 
vulnerabilities. As demonstrated in (Andzakovic, 2014), SSL Pinning can be disabled by reverse engineering the 
application and forcing it to accept spoofed SSL certificates. Additionally, the use of third-party advertising 
libraries can impact on the effectiveness of SSL Pinning. Application developers are required to consent to the 
use of the certificates provided by the advertising companies or they might not earn any revenue from 
advertisements. Since there is no control on the trusted root CA certificates or intermediate certificates used for 
advertising purposes, the application can be easily enticed into accepting spoofed certificates sent by attackers.  
SSL Pinning relies heavily on its correct implementation by the developers, and so is prone to human error. Bugs 
may remain hidden in the source code or temporary testing code left behind after the application is deployed.  
In the remainder of the paper, we focus on the DNS and investigate the use of DNSSec, which requires minimal 
developer involvement, as a means to thwart MiTM attacks. We believe that correct implementation of DNSSec 
would provide a greater level of protection against MiTM attacks than would SSL Pinning. 
DNS & DNSSEC 
Overview of DNS  
 
Figure 3: DNS Domain Structure 
The Domain Name System (DNS) is a query mechanism which links logical names (e.g. www.google.com) to IP 
addresses (e.g. 74.125.131.105). It was initially proposed in the 1980s and the details of its implementation are 
described in the standard RFC 1035 (Mockapetris, 1987). The DNS process can be divided into 4 steps: (i) 
Delegation, (ii) Zone File Management, (iii) Zone File Propagation and (iv) Resolving. 
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DNS Delegation follows an inverted tree structure, as depicted in Figure 3, and is used for name resolution. The 
structure starts with the root and is represented by a dot. Clients resolve names by following a chain of 
authoritative servers (also referred to as name servers), starting from the Root, followed by the Top-Level 
Domain (TLD) name servers, Second-Level Domain (SLD) name servers until the queried logical name is 
found.  For example, business.paypal.com is a sub-domain of the SLD paypal.com, which in turn is a sub-
domain of the generic TLD com, located under the Root domain.  
A zone may contain information about a domain and its sub-domains. Each piece of information about the 
domain, such as Owner Name (www.paypal.com), Class IN (Internet), Type A (IPv4 address) are contained in a 
Resource Record (RR), which is recorded as a single line in a zone file. We refer the reader to (Linux, 2003) for 
more information on zone files. The set of all RRs associated with the same owner name, class and type is called 
the Resource Records Set (RRSet). The primary purpose of the zone file is to link a domain to an IP address. 
Zone File Management is performed by DNS operators who are responsible for looking after particular zones. 
The RR includes other information, including Time To Live (TTL), which indicates the length of time it can be 
stored in cache and used for dissemination. This process is known as the Zone File Propagation. The entire 
process of answering a DNS query is known as Resolving.  
Since no authentication and integrity checks are done during resolving, it provides a very convenient opportunity 
for attackers to divert traffic via their MiTM proxies as DNS servers are unable to verify the correctness of 
incoming DNS data. This is the main problem with the DNS set-up, for which DNSSec was proposed as a 
solution. In the next section, we explore the application of DNSSec to protect DNS servers and prevent MiTM 
attacks.    
Overview of DNSSec   
To compensate for the lack of security in DNS, DNSSec - was implemented and standardised by the Internet 
Engineering Task Force in 1997 (Kaufman, 1997). DNSSec can be considered to be a set of security extensions 
added to the existing DNS protocol and it relies on the ‘chain of trust’. In fact, the extensions only affect the 
Zone File (second and third step) in the DNS process while the first (Delegation) and last (Resolving) steps 
remain unchanged. We provide a comparison of DNS and DNSSec in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Comparison of DNS and DNSSec 
 
DNS DNSSec 
1. Delegation 1. Delegation 
2. Zone File Management 2. Zone File Management 
3. Zone File Propagation 3. Zone File Signing (RRSIG and DNSKEY) 
4. Resolving 4. Zone File Propagation 
 5. Resolving 
 6. Verifying  
 
DNSSec applies the concept of Public Key Cryptography to authenticate the origin of data and data integrity, 
and to verify the ‘non-existence’ of a domain (also referred to as authenticated denial of existence). For each 
domain, a key pair, consisting of a public key and private key, is generated and provided by the zone 
administrator. The private key is used to sign each RRSet in a zone file. As a result, a digital signature is 
computed and is referred to as the Resource Record Signature (RRSIG). The public key, also known as 
DNSKEY, and its corresponding digital signature (RRSIG DNSKEY) are also added to the zone file. Finally, the 
Next Secure (NSEC) record together with its signature (RRSIG NSEC) are included to detect the ‘non-existence’ 
of domain names. The above process is known as the Zone File Signing and is listed as Step 3 in Table 1.  
To verify the authenticity of the DNS data (Step 6 from Table 1), the DNSKEY of the sub-domain is verified 
against a copy stored at the SLD. In turn, a copy of the SLD’s DNSKEY is verified at the TLD and the TLD’s 
DNSKEY is verified by the Root zone. This ‘chain of trust’ provides assurance that the signatures and keys are 
correct and the DNS data is authentic. 
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In the event of an MiTM attack, the client application will be unable to verify the DNS data from the MiTM 
proxy and the traffic will be interrupted because the smartphone client will not accept traffic that has been 
rerouted from the MiTM proxy which is controlled by the attacker. 
Table 2 provides a list of attacks which can be thwarted using DNSSec.  
 
Table 2: Mitigating attacks using SSL Pinning and DNSSec 
 
Types of Attacks SSL Pinning DNSSec 
SSL Hijacking No Yes 
SSL Stripping Sometimes Yes  
DNS Spoofing No Yes 
DISCUSSION 
Although, DNSSec has been standardised since 1997, there has been a slow adoption of the technology. 
According to Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, there exist 627 TLDs and only 70% of 
them have been signed as of June 2014. We highlight some of the challenges and limitations of DNSSec.     
Challenges  
Currently, there exist no incentives for smartphone developers to use DNSSec as a security measure for their 
applications. This is partly due to the lack of attention the protocol has received since its introduction but also 
due to the cost since “bandwidth and storage requirements are increased by about a factor of 6 over DNS” 
(Fetzer & Jim, 2004). In addition, the authors of (Pfeifer, Fetzer, & Jim, 2005) show “how the most important 
advantages of the different proposals for enhanced DNS transaction security can be reached using existing 
infrastructures and technologies … it provides the advantages of asymmetric cryptography and reduces the 
configuration effort.” 
At present, the smartphone platform is dominated by four popular OS. Implementation of SSL Pinning varies 
depending on the host OS and it can be time-consuming to verify its correctness during the application vetting 
process; with DNSSec, application analysts can simply extract the server domain name and check whether it is 
DNSSec-enabled.  
Furthermore, while smartphone users expect their applications to be secured, they have limited knowledge on 
how to mitigate SSL-based MiTM attacks. For instance, in some cases, attacks using SSL Stripping can be 
thwarted by simply typing the full HTTPS URL into a browser, instead of only the domain name.     
Additionally, the amount of software that allows implementation of DNSSec on DNS servers is limited. The 
most popular software, BIND, provides an extensive range of functionalities for upgrading to DNSSec; however, 
many application developers do not have this knowledge. Another challenge with DNSSec is the use of 
algorithms for signing keys. Since the underlying concept of the protocol is based on ‘chain of trust’, all the 
zones on the bottom layers all the way up to the Root zone have to use the same algorithm. Any discrepancy 
along the way could invalidate the verification of keys as the digital signatures will not match.    
Recommendations  
To encourage smartphone developers to adopt DNSSec during the application development process, we believe 
smartphone OS owners should request a form of certification from the developers before their applications can 
be uploaded on the application market. This certification will provide a guarantee that the developer has 
correctly implemented SSL Pinning and/or DNSSec and that security checks have been implemented correctly. 
There is also a need to continuously educate smartphone users on how to take cautionary measures to mitigate 
MiTM attacks. Given that antivirus applications offer no protection against these types of attacks, users should 
be made aware of the implications of accepting SSL certificates during application installation and of connecting 
to free public WiFi networks. When using the browser on their smartphones, users are advised to consistently 
type an HTTPS URL in full to reduce the chances for an attacker to successfully apply SSL Stripping. Although 
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URLs can be fairly lengthy, smartphones allow users to add keywords to the in-built dictionary; thus simplifying 
future HTTPS URL entries.   
CONCLUSION 
The exponential surge of smartphone data traffic is providing attackers with an avenue by which to deploy 
MiTM attacks easily. In this paper, we described three SSL- and DNS-based MiTM attacks and explained how 
they can be mitigated using SSL Pinning and DNSSec. Current observations highlight a lack of user awareness 
about MiTM attacks on smartphones and so we outlined the challenges and limitations as to why smartphone 
users, application developers and application market hosts fail to prevent such attacks. Finally, we presented 
some recommendations which can encourage the adoption of techniques such as SSL Pinning and DNSSec to 
thwart MiTM attacks.  
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